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NOTE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-PERFORMER'S
STYLE-A QUEST FOR ASCERTAINMENT, RECOGNITION,
AND PROTECTION*
INTRODUCTION
Because performer's "style" is a term which has heretofore
eluded accurate legal definition, recognition and protection has
not be extended to style as an intangible intellectual property
right. The unauthorized use of a performer's voice, mannerisms,
gestures, and dress is becoming an increasingly common problem
for performers who have developed a "style" immediately identi-
fiable by the public as being associated with the performer. Per-
formers who have sought judicial relief from unauthorized style
imitation have been unsuccessful in demonstrating that style is
readily capable of ascertainment and that concrete limitations do
exist as to what would constitute a protectible style. The judicial
stricture that "imitation alone does not give rise to a cause of
action" has left the performer legally unprotected from unauthor-
ized uses.'
Courts faced with controversies in the field of intellectual
property have responded to new challenges by expanding both
statutory and common law protection for creative work products.
In the resolution of these challenges the interest in freedom in the
expression of ideas was balanced with the interest in securing
"authors" a right to be free from unfair use of their creative
product. A new property right, also worthy of protection, emerges
when the issue of providing legal protection for a performer's style
is considered.
The purpose of this analysis is dual: to distinguish among the
types of style that are sufficiently developed to warrant protec-
tion, and then to examine the relevant legal theories under which
such protection should be available. This analysis will attempt to
* This article has been submitted to the annual Nathan Burkan Memorial Competi-
tion.
For cases using this language see Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d
711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362
F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D.
Cal. 1969).
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contribute to an understanding of what "style" is, the difficulties
involved in attempting to bind it definitionally, and the realiza-
tion that definitional elusiveness is not an insurmountable hind-
rance to affording legal protection.
I. PERFORMER'S STYLE: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN THE LEGAL
ARENA
The difficulty in capturing a judicially acceptable definition
of style is well illustrated through a brief factual examination of
five major cases in which performers sought protection against
unauthorized imitation. In each instance the style seeking legal
recognition differed. Damages were sought for injury to profes-
sional reputation, public deception, and financial deprivation
due to the loss of opportunity for product endorsement. The one
common thread running throughout each case is the admitted,
deliberate appropriation by defendant of a vehicle, termed
"style," through which a character or idea was expressed by the
plaintiff, without disclosing to the public that defendant's "ex-
pressor" was not the plaintiff.
A. Chaplin v. Amador
Charlie Chaplin brought suit seeking injunctive relief from
the unauthorized imitation of his character creation "Charlie
Chaplin," a funny little man who wore "a decrepit derby, ill-
fitting vest, tight-fitting coat, and trousers and shoes much too
large for him, and with this attire, flexible cane usually carried,
swung, and bent as he [performed] . . . . 3 Chaplin developed
the idea of "Charlie Chaplin" and infused life into his creation
through facial expressions, gestures, and dress, which came to be
automatically associated with the character. The defendant, as-
suming the name "Charlie Aplin," portrayed the character crea-
tion of Chaplin through imitation of his gestures, mannerisms,
and dress.
The trial court recognized Chaplin's creation "Charlie Chap-
lin" as a form of unique character expression when it stated that
the plaintiff is the first person to use the said clothes ... and it is
true that he originated, combined and perfected the manner of act-
ing and mannerisms mentioned herein as used in motion pictures,
and . . . is the first person to originate, use, combine, and perfect
2 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928).
1 Id. at 360, 269 P. at 545.
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* . . that certain form of acting, those mannerisms, facial expres-
sions and movements of his body ....
The court emphasized the concreteness provided the character
through Chaplin's creative expression, and awarded injunctive
relief on grounds of "passing-off."
And yet it could not have escaped the attention of the court
that Chaplin was the creator of the character, directed the char-
acter into production, and, through performing the character,
gave it essence. In other words, "Charlie Chaplin" was the pro-
duction of Charlie Chaplin. There were no coexisting rights held
by other persons impinging upon the creation. The court did not
have to look to copyright protection possessed by another creator
of the character nor assess the directorial molding of another as
possibly instrumental in the formation of the "style."
B. Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co.5
Bert Lahr had become known for his unique vocal character-
istics including his timing, inflection, and manner of comic deliv-
ery. Lahr's artistic creation was not associated with any particu-
lar character as was Chaplin's; in contrast, Lahr's style of vocal
delivery existed independent of any character creation, and was
a means by which he achieved notoriety and success. Defendant
appropriated Lahr's unique vocal creation for the voice of a duck
in defendant's commercial. The trial court's dismissal of Lahr's
suit was reversed by the appellate court on grounds of defama-
tion, holding "that an entertainer [who] has stooped to perform
below his class may be found to damage his reputation ....
C. Booth v. Colgate Palmolive Co.7
Shirley Booth, a well-known actress in dramatic and comedy
roles, came to be associated by the public with the cartoon char-
acter creation "Hazel" through the portrayal of that character in
the television series of the same name. Miss Booth's voice, one of
her polished dramatic tools, inevitably became associated in the
public mind with that of the character. The creator of the cartoon
character "Hazel," possessing copyright protection for the car-
toon creation, licensed defendant's use of the cartoon character
for a laundry detergent commercial.
Id.
300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962), See also Sims v. H.J. Heinz Co. [1959] 1 All. E.R.
547 (C.A.).
300 F.2d at 258 (citations omitted).
362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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Although the cartoon-creator of "Hazel" had, for compensa-
tion, granted defendant the right to use his copyrighted charac-
ter, the copyrighted cartoon character did not possess a voice. In
providing "Hazel" a voice in its commercial, defendant utilized
"Hazel's" voice by an imitation of Miss Booth's voice, absent
permission or compensation.' Irrespective of its unauthorized use,
defendant's contention that "imitation of voice without more
does not give rise to a cause of action for unfair competition," 9
was sustained by the court.
Unlike Lahr, Miss Booth had not relied upon a specially
created vocal characterization to bring "Hazel" to life in the me-
dium of television. However, to the public Miss Booth's voice
when coupled with the cartoon character "Hazel" would consti-
tute the "more" necessary to sustain a cause of action.
D. Davis v. Trans World Airlines'"
Not only individual performers, but vocal groups as well,
have been faced with unauthorized imitation. In Davis the well-
known group "The Fifth Dimension" brought suit for the unau-
thorized imitation of its unique vocal sound, particularly asso-
ciated with the song "Up, Up and Away." The defendant appro-
priated this unique sound in its use of the song in a television
commercial. Once again, the defendant successfully relied upon
the notion that "imitation alone does not give rise to a cause of
action.'""
The case parallels Lahr in that the vocal group had devel-
For purposes of their motion, defendants concede that "Ruth Holden's
voice as used in the Burst commercials constituted an 'imitation' of the
'normal speaking voice' . .. of Shirley Booth as plaintiff used it and it was
heard in the 'Hazel' situation comedy series."
Id. at 345. It has been argued that there are unique vocal qualities which accompany any
performer's voice which would not be a quality of style which should be protected. "Even
entertainers who make no claim to uniqueness have distinctive vocal characteristics and
may be thought to be recognized." 300 F.2d at 259.
362 F. Supp. at 245.
297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
Id. at 1147. It is interesting to note that in none of these cases did the courts offer
any judicial reasoning for this statement as it applies to "style." Of such judicial stricture
it has observed:
Such language can have its genesis in a first decision, be quoted and followed
by successive decisions, and ultimately become the "law of the land" even
though the original language is devoid of legal support or reasoning.
Duft & Do", Tape Piracy-Compulsory Licensing Provision of the Copyright Act, Edward
B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974), 52
DENVER L.J. 313, 321 (1975).
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oped a unique sound, which identified it and distinguished it
from other vocal groups. One could argue also that like Miss
Booth's voice association with the character "Hazel," "The Fifth
Dimension's" sound was associated with its unique expression of
the song. The copyright proprietor of the song granted permission
to defendant for the use of the song, not the right to copy "The
Fifth Dimension's" expression of that song. As the law currently
stands, given license to use the song, a defendant is also free to
appropriate the expression of that song created by another. The
defendant should be required to create his own expression of that
song, or at least be required to compensate the group for the use
of its unique expression.
E. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.'
2
Nancy Sinatra achieved instant public and professional rec-
ognition through her version of the song "These Boots Are Made
for Walkin'," distinguished by a special form of dress and delivery
exemplified by high boots and a short skirt, neither in itself nor
in concert unique or unusual. Taking advantage of plaintiff's pop-
ularity, defendant coined the phrase "Wide-Boots" for a brand of
tire, was granted the right to use the song by the copyright propri-
etor, and attempted to secure the services of Miss Sinatra for
endorsement purposes in a proposed television commercial.
When no terms acceptable to the company and Miss Sinatra
could be reached, the company continued with the idea behind
the commercial, deliberately imitating Miss Sinatra's "style" by
flashing brief glimpses of a girl, facially unrecognizable, dressed
in clothing similar to that of Miss Sinatra, using an admitted
imitation of her style of delivery in the song as well.
Miss Sinatra was denied relief, inter alia, because the court
saw an "added clash with the copyright laws [in the] potential
restriction which recognition of performers' 'secondary meanings'
places upon the potential market of the copyright proprietor. '"'
The alleged restriction was that a proposed licensee might be-
come totally discouraged if he had to "pay each artist who has
played or sung the composition and who might therefore claim
unfair competition-performer's protection . . . ."" This author
submits that such reasoning is at best without merit. If a licensee
21 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
,1 Id. at 718.
14 Id.
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wishes to secure the rights to use a song or a character in his
commercial, he has every right to do so. He does not have the
right to use the expression of that character which is created by
another. If he in good faith uses the licensed work, he should be
obliged to create his own expression, not simply appropriate that
of another.
The court in Sinatra had before it an admitted voice imita-
tion, coupled with court recognition of concomitant imitation of
dress and mannerisms following unsuccessful efforts to obtain the
services of the performer whose "style" was copied. Was the song
of no commercial value to the defendant without Sinatra or a
copy of her performance? If so, was she not entitled to compensa-
tion for the imitation of her style?
II. WHAT Is STYLE, AND WHY SHOULD IT BE PROTECTED?
The cases demonstrate the complexity of protecting style.
One questions the summary denial of protection to performers
whose creative efforts have resulted in a style which is admittedly
imitated for the commercial advantage of a defendant. The rea-
son behind denial is, in large part, an unwillingness of the courts
to enter an area in which the lines have not been drawn regarding
what is and what is not "style." This analysis approaches the
question from another perspective: Did each or any of the plain-
tiffs possess something recognizably protectible? If so, is this not
"style"?
There are distinctions which go to the very essence of why,
when, and most importantly, how protection should be afforded,
if at all. In Chaplin the performer not only created and originated
the character-idea but created and originated the expression of
the character by the additional creation of an identifiable, con-
crete style of dress, posture, and mannerisms. The court in
Chaplin found little difficulty in recognizing the right to protec-
tion of his character creation under existing legal practice. This
renders the Chaplin fact pattern deceptive in that Chaplin had
created both the character and its expression. Possibly Chaplin
served as the beginning of an almost unattainable standard which
a performer must reach before his efforts are worthy of protection.
Since Chaplin the generalization has arisen, without foundation,
that style as a character expression must be equated with the
character itself.
15
11 One author has observed that "[u]nder pure copyright doctrine ... a style of
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This standard fails in view of those performers who do not
create the characters they portray, but create only a unique ex-
pression of that character. A contemporary example would be
Peter Falk's portrayal of "Columbo." Someone other than Falk
created the idea of "Columbo," and there was directorial molding
of the character by others. However, Falk created a unique ex-
pression of the character no less stylistically distinctive than that
of Chaplin's. Falk's gestures, mannerisms, postures, and dress are
as uniquely his own interpretation of "Columbo" as Chaplin's of
"Charlie Chaplin," and exist independent of the character alone.
Lahr's unique vocal creation for comic delivery was asso-
ciated with no particular character other than himself. Yet, his
"style" of vocal delivery was so unique and well defined that it,
too, existed independent of any character. In a similar fashion
"The Fifth Dimension" 's vocal style was also unique. Thus, style
can and does exist independent of a character.
Miss Sinatra may have indeed created a unique style of per-
forming but she failed to convey to the court that she had crafted
either a unique vocal delivery or manner of dress such that a
"style" existed.'6 Possibly there are those performers whose style
is not sufficiently developed to warrant the kind of protection
available to those who have crafted an identifiable, concrete
style. The answer appears to be that there is a difference in degree
which goes to a difference in the kind of protection to be afforded.
delivery is equated to a creative idea, and there can be no cause of action for the copying
of an idea." Lang, Performance and the Right of the Performing Artist, 21 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT LAW SYMP. 69, 72-73 (1974). This same author discounts copyright protection
for a performer's style based on analogy to artists. He states:
Picasso might then have sole use of "synthetic Cubism"-or must he share
the style with Braque, Max Jacob, Juan Gris and the others who . . . were
responsible for the formation of Cubism?
Id. at 95. The author of the instant article would term "synthetic Cubism" a movement
in art, such as folk music might be termed a "movement" in musical tastes. Within that
movement each artist has his own unique style which distinguishes his expression of
Cubism from that of others. Certainly no one would argue that no artist other than Picasso
could paint in the "synthetic Cubism" movement. Style goes to the individual-i.e., one
of the basic methods of artistic analysis of unsigned paintings is by an examination of the
method of applying pigments, choice of canvas, and stroke techniques. These are but a
few of the considerations given to distinguishing one artist's unique, identifiable style.
IS The court noted:
In this case appellant's complaint is not that her sound is uniquely personal;
it is that the sound in connection with the lyrics and arrangement, which
made her the subject of popular identification, ought to be protected.
435 F.2d at 716 (emphasis added). However, Miss Sinatra did allege a unique style of dress
as well, which the court did not see fit to discuss.
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Only in connection with the character "Hazel" did Miss
Booth's voice assume a recognizable quality entitling her to pro-
tection from its imitation. What kind of protection should be
afforded performers who develop their own best personal traits,
which later become either identified with a character creation or
identifiable with the performer independent of a character? A
number of performers' voices are identifiable as such. Imitation
of this voice in a commercial without further identification could
mislead the public into believing that the performer was actually
endorsing the product. Absent identification, this could be the
sponsor's only intent. Such use would constitute "imitation
alone," unless the voice becomes associated with an expression of
a character or idea as in Booth. Here, there exists no infringement
of the performer's artistic talents but strictly an infringement of
the performer's right to select that with which he will be asso-
ciated in the public mind.
The thread linking these distinctions remains: the
deliberate, unauthorized, and unrevealed copying of the per-
former or his unique style by a defendant who has everything to
gain and nothing to lose as the law currently stands. If a defen-
dant deliberately appropriates that which is associated with the
professional endeavours of another, be it style or personal traits
identifiable by the public, the appropriation of these efforts
should constitute a cause of action.
III. PROTECTION OF STYLE
The complexities of protecting style should be recognized as
overshadowed by the challenge of resolving why and when this
style should be protected. The remainder of this analysis will be
devoted to a discussion of both statutory and common law protec-
'1 Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution states that Congress shall have the
power
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries ...
Thus, if style can be defined as a "writing" within the meaning given to this term,
statutory protection should be available should Congress see fit to include style among
those protectible "writings" in 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970).
One author has noted that "[the scope of protectible 'writings' as defined by the
Copyright Law, is generally considered to be more narrow than the constitutional term
'writings'...." Oler, Copyright for Characters: The Search for Statutory and State Law
Protection, 16 IDEA 1, 12 (1974) (emphasis added), citing W. Derenberg, "The Meaning
of 'Writings' in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution," Study No. 3 in COPYRIGHT LAW
REvISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS AND STUDIES, Nos. 1-34 (1961).
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tion which should be afforded to performers by states in the ab-
sence of federal protection. First, if style is a "writing" within the
framework of the Constitution, 7 copyright protection should be
available for those performers who have "authored" a "style."
Consideration will also be given to unfair advertising practices,
followed by a discussion of unfair competition, misappropriation,
defamation, and the right of publicity.
A. Is Style a "Writing"?
The proper subject for copyright protection is not the idea
but rather the expression of that idea.'" Viewing a performer's
style as the expression of an idea, copyright protection is indeed
a possibility for persons possessing a style similar to that exempli-
fied by Chaplin or Lahr. That style can be classified as a "writ-
ing" under article I, section 8 of the Constitution is evident from
the historical basis of the copyright clause. 9 In keeping with the
early views expressed, there has been a gradual and liberal expan-
sion of what constitutes "writings." ' " Case law has so broadly
construed "writings" as to include lamp base statuettes as "works
81 "It is a fundamental precept of copyright that only the expression of ideas, and not
the ideas themselves are copyrightable." 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11.1, at
39 (1974). Professor Nimmer further notes that "[there have been no cases squarely
ruling on the question of whether common law copyright may be claimed in a non-tangible
oral or visual expression." Id. at 40 (emphasis added). However, in Estate of Hemingway
v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 346, 244 N.E.2d 250, 254, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 777
(1968), the court did recognize the possibility, when it stated: "The principle that it is
not the tangible embodiment of the author's work but the creation of the work itself which
is protected finds recognition in a number of ways in copyright law." If style is indeed a
"non-tangible oral or visual expression" why is not common law copyright available? Must
a performer be denied the right to protection merely because his "expression" is concrete
but "intangible"? See notes 29-32 infra and accompanying text.
11 During the Continental Congress the need was early recognized for protection of
literary property in order to advance the arts by securing to authors the exclusive rights
to their writings. See Selvin, Parody and Burlesque of Copyrighted Works as
Infringement, 6 BuLL. CR. Soc'y 53, 57 (1958). An excellent article discussing writings
under the Constitution interpreted the historical intent and subsequent judicial interpre-
tation of the scope of this clause. See Note, Copyright-Study of the Term "Writings" in
the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1263 (1956). In reflecting upon
a discussion in THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison), the authors conclude:
The statement places no limitation, either direct or implied, upon the scope
of the clause but rather intimates that the types of objects protected will
expand when the common law sees fit to expand them.
Id. at 1267.
2 Note, supra note 19, at 1311. See also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). Statutory protection is now afforded to works of art and sound
recordings. 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1970) (works of art) and § 5(n) (Supp. II, 1972) (sound
recordings), which are obviously not "writings" within the literal meaning of this term.
1975
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
of art."' 1 One leading authority has concluded that the constitu-
tional provision intends
to protect all intellectual property capable of extensive reproduc-
tion, and that whenever new methods of reproduction made possible
the "pirating" of unprotected works resulting from intellectual ef-
fort, the clause could be expanded to include these objects.
22
The manner in which a performer's style qualifies for copyright
protection by meeting the more liberal interpretation of "writ-
ings" is analyzed below.
1. Expression of a Character
Fictional characters standing alone are not subject to copy-
right protection.2 3 However, they are so entitled once incorporated
into a book or play because it is "in their relationships and inte-
gration with the sequence of incidents, scenes, locale, motivation
and dramatic expression through which the story, novel or play
is evolved, '2 4 that the characters move from the realm of ideas to
the expressions of those ideas. Examined more closely, the words
"dramatic expression" are of significance. Unless formally part of
a literary writing, a character to be portrayed by a performer
would not be eligible for protection; only through dramatic ex-
pression of the character does protection become possible. In
order to invoke relationships, motivations, and scenes, the per-
former dramatizes through voice, mannerisms, and dress, trans-
forming the character-idea into a unique character-expression.
The performer thereby creates a style which expresses the charac-
21 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). In construing the meaning of artistic works,
hence writings, courts have gone so far as making textile fabric designs eligible for copy-
right protection "where ... the designs reflect creative originality and a substantial
degree of skill, labor and independent judgment." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Acadia Co.,
173 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Even reproductions of paintings are independently
copyrightable. Home Art, Inc. v. Glensder Textile Corp., 81 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
"Writings" has been broadened to include items which are not literal writings, as these
cases indicate.
2 Note, supra note 19, at 1269.
21 Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950
(9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955). But see Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), where Judge Hand recognized that characters, if
sufficiently developed to constitute a "distinctive word portrait," they should be protecti-
ble "quite independently of the 'plot' proper .... " For a more recent discussion of
copyright protection for characters see Note, Characters and the Copyright Clause-Is a
Character a Writing?, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 222 (1974).
24 WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION RIGHTS, § 231b, at 1003 (1953) (emphasis added).
See also Kellman, The Legal Protection of Fictional Characters, 25 BROOKLYN L. REV. 3,
8 (1958). It is an "idea" which may be copied, not the "expression" of that idea, which
distinction gives rise to the excellent discussion by Mr. Kellman.
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ter in such defined terms that it exists independent of that char-
acter. Since this metastasis is made possible by the performer's
style, the style should then become eligible for protection under
copyright laws. Just as an author creates the book or play as his
expression of an idea, so a performer may create a unique style
as his expression.
The protection afforded cartoon characters exemplifies how
character-expression has been assessed for copyright purposes in
another medium. Cartoons have traditionally been the subject of
individual copyright for each strip, no protection being afforded
the characters alone .2  As one court has noted: "[Elvery such
cartoon embodies a conception of humor or surprise or incredibil-
ity .. . [w]hat the owner of the copyright is entitled to is the
protection of that embodiment of his concept. '2 In granting relief
for infringement upon the "Superman" character, the court ex-
plained in its modifying opinion that the character was eligible
for protection because the pictorial representations and verbal
descriptions of "Superman" embodied an arrangement of inci-
dents and literary expressions as opposed to a mere delineation
of the character alone.Y The court reiterated that a monopoly for
a mere character was not allowed, but at the same time ordered
the defendant to cease imitating the costume and appearance of
"Superman. ''28
Having originated the character-idea "Charlie Chaplin,"
Chaplin fashioned mannerisms, dress, and gestures by which the
I Note, Unfair Competition-The Protection Afforded Literary and Cartoon Charac-
ters Through Trademark, Unfair Competition and Copyright, 68 H~Av. L. REv. 349, 358
(1954).
This was explained by the court in Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955). Here,
the court denied that the character "Sam Spade" was protectible apart from the comic
strip as a whole; one commentator stated that cartoon characters are protectible within
the comic strip because what is appropriated is the "expression and development." Kell-
man, supra note 24, at 10. It may thus be appropriate to say that a performer's style is
the method of expression and development of a character. Although it is unfortunate that
a character is not in itself protectible, this does not prohibit protection of style if style is
defined in terms of expression.
" Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 399, 400 (S.D.N.Y.
1939), modified, 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940).
'7 111 F.2d at 433-34.
23 Id. See also Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), wherein
the court found infringement upon the characters of "Mutt and Jeff" because the speech
and dress of the characters were substantially copied by defendants, and the representa-
tion was intended to and did in fact affect adversely the value of the copyright, even
though the characters were set in a different plot.
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idea was transformed into an identifiable character. Although
"Charlie Chaplin" was not protected under copyright, the court
recognized Chaplin's ownership of the character vis-a-vis imita-
tion which might result in public deception. The court did not
consider the originator-performer combination as determinative,
and the decision appears to have been founded essentially on the
performing style by which embodiment of the idea took place.
Thus, it can be argued that Chaplin, through dramatic expres-
sion, transformed a character-idea into a character-expression,
rendering the expression of the character-style-copyrightable.
For Mr. Lahr, "The Fifth Dimension," and Mr. Falk, all of whom
have created a unique style, such expression exists independently
of any "character" creation and is no less definable and concrete
than Mr. Chaplin's. Since style can and does exist independent
of any character, those who have created their own gestures, man-
nerisms, timing, and type of vocal delivery have developed a
unique artistic expression.
2. Meeting Statutory Standards of "Concreteness"
Before copyright protection may be secured an author clearly
must put his ideas into some concrete form, as it is an appropria-
tion of that form which is prohibited.29 However, there exists a
misconception regarding requirements of tangibility and con-
creteness. The general conclusion is that the Constitution re-
quires tangibility of form.30 "Tangible" is defined as "capable of
being touched; . . . readily apprehensible by the mind; real;
.... ",31 In contrast, "concrete" is "characterized by immediate
experience of realities whether physical things, sensations, or
emotions: belonging to or standing for actual things or events: not
abstract or ideal. ' 3 Although there exists no immediate tangibil-
ity in a performer's style, an idea, such as style, which is capable
of perception is concrete. For purposes of federal copyright pro-
tection, style must be reduced to tangible form. Tangibility re-
quirements can be met by registering tapes of voice or video tapes
of the gestures, mannerisms, and style of dress involved in the
expression of the character portrayed. Upon alleged infringement,
these registered tangibles would provide an objective standard by
,9 Note, supra note 25, at 356.
10 Dunlap, Expansion of the Copyright Law into the Area of Conversations, 20 BULL.
CR. Soc'Y 285, 296 (1973). See also 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 302 (1970).
' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1627 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
3 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 472 (third definition listed) (P.
Gove ed. 1961).
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which the alleged infringement of voice, dress, and mannerisms
could be judged.
3. Infringement Upon Style
If Congress should include style as a "writing" within the
federal copyright statutes, when infringement upon a performer's
style were alleged the question as to what constitutes infringe-
ment would arise. Infringement of writings is defined as "[a]
copy, more or less servile, of a copyrighted work."33
In other areas of artistic property, the courts have estab-
lished various standards for judging infringement. When assess-
ing whether an object had been the subject of copyright infringe-
ment, the court in Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner
Corp.34 stated the test to be whether "the ordinary observer, un-
less he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to
overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.
'35
The test for evaluating the possible existence of substantial simi-
larity between a copyrighted property and an alleged copy was
more liberally stated in Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd.3 as
"whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.
'37
Style, as the culmination of creative effort by a performer
such as Lahr, for example, could be judged by the same criteria:
(1) if the average person listening to an unidentified voice imita-
tion would normally assume the voice to have originated from its
performer-creator, or (2) if an ordinary individual could visually
recognize dress and mannerisms associated with a particular per-
former's style as a copy of the original, an appropriation of that
performer's style would be found. In the area of cartoon charac-
ters, items such as dolls 3 and toy horses39 have been held to
infringe upon the copyright of their respective cartoon characters.
These items, as an imitation of the original creation, are not in
substance different from an unauthorized imitation of a style
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 920 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). In order for the copy to constitute
infringement "[T]here must be appropriation of substantial portions of the copyright
matter . . . ." Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126, 127 (S.D. Cal. 1927).
274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
Id. at 489.
360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966).
'7 Id. at 1022.
Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 294 U.S. 717 (1935).
" King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924).
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created by a performer. An imitation of a performer's style is as
perceptible to the average person as is an imitation of a cartoon
character. Because there has been little difficulty in establishing
tests for judging the existence of infringement in other artistic
areas, style should be no exception if viewed in its most elemen-
tary form-the work product of creative effort.
4. Does a Defense Imply a Cause of Action?
The defense of fair use is allowed in actions for alleged copy-
right infringement. Fair use is the privilege accorded others to use
the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the
copyright proprietor's consent. 0 In the field of performer's style,
mimicry has long been recognized as a separate and distinct tal-
ent of its own under the guise of a different variety of the histori-
cal art of singing." Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon4" was a cornerstone
" WARNER, supra note 24, § 157, at 612. Fair use as well as its relationship to copyright
infringement has been the subject of numerous discussions. See Cohen, Fair Use in the
Law of Copyright, 6 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. Symu. 43 (1955); Netterville, Copyright and
Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 225
(1962); Selvin, supra note 19; Wyckoff, Defenses Peculiar to Actions Based on Infringe-
ment of Musical Copyrights, 5 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SymP. 256 (1954).
" See, e.g., Murray v. Rose, 30 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Savage v. Hoffman, 159
F. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1908). Parody, the partner of mimicry, is a humorous or satirical imita-
tion of a serious piece of literature or writing. THE RANDOM HOUSE DCTIONARY OF THE
ENGUSH LANGUAGE 1050 (first definition listed) (unabr. ed. 1966). Parody has also been
traditionally recognized as a defense to alleged infringement. See Green v. Minzenshei-
mer, 177 F. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); cf. Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
The case of Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.
Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub
noma. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (per curiam),
had a somewhat sobering effect upon parody as fair use of copyrighted works. Jack
Benny's television parody of the play and motion picture Gas Light failed to obtain
privilege as fair use because of substantial copying. The court felt that there was no
authority that would support the idea "that wholesale copying and publication of copy-
righted material can ever be fair use." 239 F.2d at 536, quoting Neon v. Pacific Tel. &
Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937). Despite this, fair use as a defense to copyright
infringement does exist in the form of parody and mimicry.
42 125 F. 977 (E.D. Pa. 1903). The court held that the copyright proprietor of the song
"Sammy" had no cause of action against the owners of a musical comedy in which Fay
Templeton imitated the original style of delivery of the song created by Lotta Faust. The
court recognized that
where . ..it is clearly established that the imitation is in good faith...
the performance is [not] forbidden .. . .Fay Templeton .. .merely imi-
tates the singer; and the interest in her own performance is due, not to the
song, but to the degree of excellence of the imitation. This is a distinct and
different variety of the histrionic art from the singing of songs . ...
Id. at 978-79 (emphasis added).
The problem encountered is where to draw the line between permissible fair use and
infringement. One commentator has noted that, as in most of the law, drawing the line
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case dealing with the imitation of another's performance. One
analysis of the court's decision allowing fair use as a defense has
noted:
[Wihere the imitation is of another's unique performance, actions,
gestures, tones, etc., and where the imitator's own excellence of
talent contributes materially to the acceptability of the imitation
and where the imitation is done in good faith, the imitation is not
an example of literary larceny.'3
Such analysis admits to, yet ignores, a critical issue: the legal
system recognizes the existence of style-in its words "actions,
gestures, tones"-for which no legal protection is available.
Nonetheless, protection in the form of a defense is afforded the
imitator in an action for infringement because of the presence of
his own excellence of talent, that is, style. How can the imitator's
own style make him incapable of legally infringing upon the style
of another, if the other's style is not entitled to legal protection?
The recognition of a defense based upon the copier's own style
logically extends to legal recognition of a cause of action for in-
fringement of the style of the performer copied.
5. A Call for Congressional Action
Style, as either a single perfected characteristic or as the
combination of voice, gestures, and mannerisms of a performer,
can be classified as a writing under the Constitution and copy-
right protection would be constitutionally available if Congress
should so enact. It would appear that Congress should continue
the expansion of the term "writings" by providing protection for
style through amendment to the present federal copyright laws.
Congress might provide that the determination of the style of a
particular performer be made by setting requirements for regis-
tering style by means of the filing of tapes and pictorial descrip-
tions of the performer's creative work product. In a given case
infringement upon style would be determined by the same tests
used in establishing infringement in other copyrighted areas. The
defense of fair use would, of course, be applicable.
Protection for the expression of characters, both self-created
and otherwise, is needed in order to secure to such performers the
between fair use and infingement is one of degree. Selvin, supra note 19, at 63. As Judge
Hand stated, the question is "whether the part so taken is 'substantial,' and therefore not
a 'fair use' of the copyrighted work." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119,
121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
,3 Netterville, supra note 40, at 249 (emphasis added).
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right to be free from unauthorized use, especially where commer-
cial exploitation and public deception result. Copyright offers the
possibility of affording protection to those who create the expres-
sion of a character, such as Chaplin; and those who create a
unique expression per se, such as Lahr.
Since Congress in the past has not seen fit to provide copy-
right protection to a performer's style, other alternatives must be
examined. These alternatives do exist via state statutory and
common law theories in light of the Supreme Court decision in
Goldstein v. California.44 The following discussion will focus on
the legal justification for protection under these legal theories.
B. Lanham Act § 43(a): False Advertising45
The distinct possibility exists that a performer's style might
one day be protected from unauthorized commercial exploitation
through section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Professor McCarthy
has noted that "§ 43(a) is designed to protect the right of the
consumer to be told the truth."" Of the cases discussed in this
article17 only Miss Booth alleged a cause of action under section
43(a).1s It is indeed unfortunate that the court passed over this
44 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
11 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970). This section provides:
Any person who shall. . . use in connection with any goods or services. ..
a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, in-
cluding words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the
same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce . ..
shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality
falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is
situated or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged
by the use of any such false description or representation.
11 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETION § 27:3, at 247 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as MCCARTHY]. Professor McCarthy further comments upon the useful-
ness of section 43(a):
[W]hatever the explanation for the slow start of § 43(a), the volume of §
43(a) litigation greatly increased in the decade 1960-1970.
Admittedly, § 43(a) is not intended to bring all types of unfair competi-
tion in interstate commerce within federal jurisdiction. But § 43(a) furnishes
a valuable tool for honest commercial concerns, if not consumers, to blow the
whistle on the false advertising tactics of sellers.
Id. § 27:9, at 259 (citations omitted). For an excellent critical analysis of section 43(a) see
Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: You've Come
a Long Way, Baby-Too Far Maybe?, 49 IND. L.J. 84 (1973).
11 See note 2-14 supra and accompanying text.
48 Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 348-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The
court held:
It is evident . ..that . ..this alleged cause of action is also insufficient
to entitle the plaintiff to relief. There is no indication that plaintiff used her
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cause of action so hastily, as the applications of section 43(a) are
not yet realized. The Second Circuit apparently has rejected the
application of the Act unless the parties are in direct competition,
despite the distinct wording of the Act to the contrary. 9 This was
one of several reasons given for the denial of Miss Booth's allega-
tion under section 43(a), yet the same court found no such prob-
lem in a later case, at least for purposes of issuing a preliminary
injunction.?0
However, Miss Booth did fail to show that her voice in any
way functioned as a trademark, which failure would, in and of
itself, negate a cause of action in her situation. At this point a
question is raised concerning those whose style of performing, be
it of a particular character (Chaplin or Falk) or merely a uniquely
personal style irrespective of any character (Lahr), serves to iden-
tify their performance and distinguish it from that of any other
performer. Could this style ever serve as a trademark protectible
from unauthorized deceptive imitation in commercial advertis-
ing, where that style is used by an advertiser to lead the public
into believing that the performer is endorsing the product?
Arguably, Mr. Chaplin and Mr. Lahr would have been able
to recover under section 43(a). Each had a style which served to
distinguish his performance from those of all others. In keeping
with the purpose of protecting the consumer from false designa-
tion of product origin, a manufacturer who deceives the public
into thinking that a certain performer endorses the product, or
another performer who appropriates that style such as in the
Chaplin case, should be held liable under section 43(a). A singer
who has created an identifiable style that has been the key to his
voice in connection with any "goods or services," nor that her voice alone can
serve as a trademark or trade name, nor that plaintiff and defendants were
in competition, nor even that the defendants used any description or made
any representation to identify her, apart from the use of the Hazel cartoon
character ....
Id. (citations omitted).
,' "It is submitted that such a restrictive reading of § 43(a) is both bad policy and
improper judicial interpretation of clear statutory language." 2 McCARTHY § 27:5, at 249.
10 See Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y.) (preliminary
injunction granted), 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), wherein the question of direct
competition never arose, at least for purposes of issuing a preliminary injunction under
section 43(a). Here defendant, a toy manufacturer, was restrained from representing its
dolls as being created and approved by the plaintiff, the author and creator of Dr. Suess




success should also be protected here. In this author's mind, there
is little difference between a "mark" which distinguishes one per-
son's manufactured or printed product or services from another's
and a performer's style which distinguishes one performer's per-
formance from another's. In many situations, the use of such a
"mark" upon a product is accompanied by an implication of
quality or endorsement. The stamp of a particular performer
upon a product certainly carries with it an implication of the
latter. The possibilities of protection of style from commercial
exploitation under this section are as yet unexplored and one may
only speculate at this time that its applications will be expanded.
C. State Statutory and Common-Law Protection of Style
The frustrations which have been encountered in obtaining
protection for any uncopyrightable creative works were com-
pounded by the decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.51
and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc."2 In these decisions
the Supreme Court held that states may not apply state unfair
competition laws in order to protect those works not subject to
protection under federal patent or copyright law. 53 As a result, at
least two cases involving style turned upon these rulings and
denied protection.
5 4
One wonders whether the founding fathers who said in the Constitu-
tion that Congress had the power to secure to "Authors" the exclu-
sive right to their "writings" would have thought that this meant
that the states were thereby prevented from protecting against ap-
, 376 U.S. 225, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
12 376 U.S. 234, rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964).
13 [W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or copyright, state law
may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid copying would interfere
with the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in
the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever
the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain.
Id. at 237. There has been much discussion of the states' rights to afford protection in light
of these decisions. See Gamboni, Unfair Competition Protection After Sears and Compco,
15 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 1 (1967); Comment, Copyright Pre-emption and Character
Values: The Paladin Case as an Extension of Sears and Compco, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1018
(1968); Note, Unfair Competition Protection After Sears and Compco, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV.
101 (1965); Note, Unfair Competition After Sears and Compco, 22 VAND. L. REv. 129
(1968).
11 See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 319 (1st Cir. 1967), wherein the misap-
propriation doctrine was deemed to have been overruled by Sears-Compco on the rationale
that where a "writing" is within the scope of the copyright clause of the Constitution and
"Congress has not protected it, whether deliberately or by unexplained omission, it can
be freely copied."
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propriation of distinctive performer characterizations merely be-
cause Congress had failed to legislate in this particular matter. Such
a denial of state power throws entertainers to the dubious remedy
of lobbying in Congress for special interest protective legislation. It
is difficult to believe that the Constitution and Sears-Compco policy
should be so bent out of shape as to deprive entertainers from mak-
ing use of common law principles which protect the public from
confusion and commercial interests from outright poaching.5
Then came the Supreme Court decision in Goldstein v.
California"5 which opened the door for state statutory and
common law protection, particularly protection of style.57 Profes-
sor McCarthy has noted that "the failure of Congress to grant
federal copyright protection to distinctive literary and entertainer
characterizations does not deprive the states of the power to pro-
tect such creations under state unfair competition law."5" Addi-
tionally, Mercury Record Productions, Inc. v. Economic Consult-
ants, Inc."5 has interpreted the decision as extending the right not
only to state statutory protection but also to common law protec-
15 1 MCCARTHY, § 10:21, at 308.
11 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), wherein the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a California penal statute prohibiting the piracy of sound record-
ings. In so doing the court recognized that article I, section 8 of the Constitution does not
expressly or by inference vest power to grant copyright protection exclusively in the federal
government and that 17 U.S.C. §§ 4, 5 do not preempt state control over all works to which
the term "writings" might apply.
See Comment, Goldstein v. California: Breaking Up Federal Copyright Preemption,
74 COLUM. L. REv. 960 (1974); Note, Goldstein v. California: A Validity of State Copyright
Under the Copyright and Supremacy Clauses, HASTINGs L.J. 1196 (1974); Note,
Copyrights: States Allowed to Protect Works Not Copyrightable Under Federal Law, 58
MINN. L. REv. 316 (1973); Comment, Copyright-New Light on Sears and Compco-State
Copyright Laws Are Not Totally Preempted by the Copyright Act, 5 TEx. TECH. L. REv.
843 (1974); Comment, Goldstein v. California-The Constitutionality of a State
Copyright, 1973 UTAH L. Rv. 851; Note, Goldstein v. California and the Protection of
Sound Recordings: Arming the States for Battle with the Pirates, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
604 (1974).
11 Kaul, And Now, State Protection of Intellectual Property?, 60 A.B.A.J. 198, 202
(1974).
Not only does Goldstein offer the opportunity to states for "tailor-made"
legislation dependent upon individual needs, it also gives the unique oppor-
tunity to test the feasibility of copyright protection in new areas on a local-
ized basis without resort to federal copyright protection until such time as
interpretative case law emerges. In particular, New York and California, as
centers of the entertainment industry are presented with a challenge to re-
spond to the needs of those "authors" of "style" which heretofore have gone
unheard.
1 McCARTHY, § 10:20, at 13 (Supp. 1973).
64 Wis. 2d 163, 218 N.W.2d 705 (1974), appeal docketed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S.
Nov. 29, 1974) (No. 74-674), wherein the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the right of a
state to assert the common law misappropriation doctrine against tape pirates.
1975
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tion as well..6 ' The continued development and expansion of com-
mon law principles should now freely emerge, unhampered by the
remnants of Sears-Compco, allowing protection for performers'
style.
1. Unfair Competition: Appropriation of Style
In the past, protection of a performer's style has been sought
primarily under the theory of unfair competition."' Unfair compe-
We conclude . . . that Goldstein permits state protection by common
law as well as by statute . . . . The Goldstein court pointed out that such a
conflict does not arise in the case of recordings of musical performances,
because in this category of "Writing," Congress has not drawn a balance.
No federal scheme has been devised that is applicable to the subject matter
of this action . . . . Under Goldstein, a state is free to apply its own law.
Id. at 177, 218 N.W.2d at 712 (emphasis added).
" See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (lst
Cir. 1962); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Other
grounds were indiscriminately alleged in combination, including defamation; the result
is an area of law in which no clear-cut answers are available. For example, one commenta-
tor has noted that "[tihe overlapping of principles between copyright and unfair compe-
tition has caused a great deal of confusion in arriving at solutions to problems involving
copyright and unfair competition questions." Leach & Feldman, The Relationship Be-
tween Copyright and Unfair Competition Principles, 10 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 266
(1959).
The matter is further complicated when the defense of fair use is applied with equal
force to unfair competition problems as well as copyright problems.
[T]he jurisprudence indicates that the concept of fair use is the same in
copyright law and unfair competition; and, consequently, unfair use under
unfair competition principles cannot be a fair use for purposes of copyright
law, and there will be copyright infringement.
Id. at 279. See also Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F.2d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1950) (dictum);
West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1909), modified, 176 F.
833 (2d Cir. 1910). The result of this overlap is the problem of seeking protection for style
under two merging theories of recovery, with a defense which applies to both theories.
The introduction of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act in 1964 has resulted
in codification of many of the unfair competition principles in several states. Thus far,
the uniform legislation has received only limited acceptance; those states which have
enacted the act have established the prime vehicle for protection of performers and the
public from unauthorized appropriation of style and/or personal characteristics. The rele-
vant portion of the statute is delineated in section 2:
(a) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of
his business, vocation, or occupation he:
(1) passes off goods or services as those of another;
(2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the
source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services;
(3) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affili-
ation, connection, or association with, or certification by, another
(5) represents that goods or services have sponsorship approval,
characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do
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tition is of special significance in prohibiting the exploitation of
style through unauthorized imitation in commercial advertising.
An examination of unfair competition as it relates to literary
property will provide an opportunity to better understand the
applicability of unfair competition principles to cases involving
appropriation of style.
In an action for unfair competition "a person who establishes
a trade name or symbol as the means by which the public identi-
fies his goods may obtain damages and an injunction against
another who sells his products under that symbol or name.""2 One
author has suggested that unfair competition cases generally fall
into three overlapping categories." First is the commonly termed
"palming-off"' or "passing-off," which consists of making false
representations to the public with the intent to deceive, thereby
not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affilia-
tion, or connection that he does not have ....
(12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likeli-
hood of confusion or misunderstanding.
(b) In order to prevail in an action under this Act, a complainant need not
prove competition between the parties or actual confusion or misunderstan-
ding
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 131-
32 (1964), revised at 306-15 (1966) (emphasis added). As of 1973, the following states have
enacted the act, retaining section 2 in substantially the same form: (Colorado) COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 6-1-105 (1973); (Delaware) DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2532(a) (Rev. 1974);
(Georgia) GA. CODE ANN. § 106-702(a)(1) to (12) (1968); (Hawaii) HAwIi REv. STAT.
§ 481A-3 (Supp. 1974); (Idaho) IDAHO CODE § 48-603 (Supp. 1974); (Illinois) ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 1211/2 § 312 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); (Kansas) KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-626(b)
(Supp. 1974); (Maine) ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1212 (Supp. 1974-75); (Nebraska)
NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-202 (1971 reissue); (New Mexico) N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-15-2(C)
(Supp. 1973); (Ohio) OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02 (Page 1973); (Oklahoma) OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 78 § 53 (Supp. 1974-75). As recent authorities have noted:
Several state legislatures passed this Uniform Act. But differences concern-
ing recovery of costs and counsel fees caused a revision of the proposal in
1966. As a consequence of Sears and Compco decisions. . . the first impetus
toward passage of the Uniform Act was slowed down by the understandable
desire on the part of the state legislatures to await the effect of these deci-
sions upon this entire area of the law. ...
Eventually, about one quarter of the States enacted one or the other of
the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Acts. A number of other states
passed acts of their own drafting. As a consequence, what prevails now are
not fifty different statutory schemes, but about five or six of them.
1 G. ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, THE LAw OF ADVERTISING, § 13.03[3][a] (1973) (footnotes
omitted).
'2 Note, supra note 25, at 349. For excellent discussions on background in unfair
competition, see Callmann, What is Unfair Competition?, 28 GEO. L.J. 585 (1940); Chafee,
Unfair Competition, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1940).
11 P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES, 107-
08 (1973).
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inducing it to believe that the goods or services of another are
those of the plaintiff. 4 Professor Prosser states the test in such
cases to be "whether the resemblance is so great as to deceive the
ordinary consumer acting with the caution usually exercised in
such transactions, so that he may mistake one for the other. '6 5 A
less stringent standard is now applied in palming-off situations:
the plaintiff need not show an actual intent to deceive but only
that the false representation is likely to deceive.66
The second is secondary meaning, found when an article is
used in such a way and to such an extent that the public comes
to identify the goods or services as those of the plaintiff, making
them distinguishable from all others. 7 The third, usually called
trademark, exists when the plaintiff's symbol or device is distinc-
tive and functions exclusively to identify the plaintiff. 8 It is often
conclusively presumed that its unauthorized use by another will
be attended by consumer deception. 9
Before examining case law involving performer's style and
unfair competition, an important distinction must be drawn be-
tween imitation and the elements of fraud and deception. In a
case of mere imitation of style, the public would normally be
aware that a performance was a duplication of an original. In such
case, the privilege of fair use would allow this imitation as mim-
icry or parody. 0 The applicability of unfair competition to imita-
tion of style arises when the elements of fraud and deception
become apparent. Here the public is either intentionally deceived
or a likelihood of public deception is present." In other words, the
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToiRs § 130, at 957 (4th ed. 1971) [herein-
after cited as PROSSER].
Id. at 957-58.
OS Id. at 958. "In an action for unfair competition plaintiff has the burden to prove
by whatever means he can that defendant's conduct has or is likely to cause confusion
... " Pennsylvania Dutch Co. v. Pennsylvania Amish Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. 41, 45 (C.P.
Cumberland County 1974). Herein the court concluded that there are three ways in which
a plaintiff may discharge this burden: 1) by showing actual confusion; 2) by relying on
experts to testify as to the effect that the conduct and business practices of the parties
are likely to have on the average consumer; or 3) by relying on the fact finding ability of
the court to determine that the average purchaser will be deceived as to the source of the
defendant's goods. Id. (citations omitted).
67 PROSSER at 959.
p. GOLDSTEIN , supra note 63, at 108.
6' Id. at 107-08.
T' See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
7' See, e.g., Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, Inc., 15 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1926).
But see Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
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style of a particular performer is passed-off as that of another, or
the imitation is presented in such a way that the public is led to
believe that it is the original artist performing. Traditionally, the
presence of deception has been the key to a finding of unfair
competition.
In Chaplin the court found secondary meaning in Chaplin's
character-creation "Charlie Chaplin. '"72 The public was deliber-
ately led to believe that the imitator was the real Charlie Chaplin,
which belief constituted the requisite fraud and deception upon
the public to sustain an allegation of "passing-off" thereby justi-
fying the court's grant of injunctive relief from copying. The test
for whether the identity of the character was revealed is by judg-
ing the probable reaction in the public's mind.73 As it would apply
to style, this test serves as an objective standard: if the ordinary
viewer would mistake the style or voice for that of its true creator,
then passing-off is present.
A query at this point is whether the tort of passing-off can
be extended to voice imitation alone. The leading cases dealing
with voice imitation indicate that this is possible. In Lahr the
First Circuit, in reversing the trial court's dismissal, stated that
imitation of the voice could constitute unfair competition by
passing-off.74 In a similar English case, the court did not pass on
the question therein, but did recognize "a grave defect in the law
if it were possible for a party, for the purpose of commercial gain,
to make use of the voice of another without his consent."7 5 As one
commentator has so accurately observed: "A voice which
identifies a famous man as clearly as does his name or likeness
7 93 Cal. App. at 361, 269 P. at 546.
7 Gardella v. Log Cabin Prod. Co., 89 F.2d 891, 897 (2d Cir. 1937). Here the plaintiff
sought and the trial court granted, relief for unauthorized imitation of the character "Aunt
Jemima." The Second Circuit reversed on grounds that the plaintiff could not recover
under the Right of Privacy Statute, NEW YORK CIVIL RIGHTs LAw §§ 50, 51 (1903), but
that unfair competition could be established only in accordance with the court's direc-
tives. See also Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942). Here the defendant
appeared in circuses around the country as the "Lone Ranger." The court directed the
lower court to enjoin further performances by the defendant because the performances
involved fraudulent appropriation of the plaintiff's character and goodwill established
through the original "Lone Ranger" radio program.
7, 300 F.2d at 259.
7' Sims v. H.J. Heinz Co. [1959] 1 All. E.R. 547, 551 (C.A.). See Mathieson,
"Passing Off" of Actor's Voice-Appropriation of Another's Personality Without His Con-
sent-An Equitable Right of Privacy?, 39 CAN. B. REv. 409 (1961). The author therein




would seem to present simply another manifestation of personal-
ity that ought to be likewise protected against commercial use."7
If a character's voice is created by a performer and becomes so
identifiable with the performer that the public associates it only
with the performer, any imitation which deceives the public into
believing that it is the performer's voice would constitute fraud
and deception upon the public. A performer's work product, such
as Lahr's style of vocal delivery, is as much an expression of
creative ability as any book, and as salable as any manufactured
goods and services.
Although in Booth the New York court denied relief under
unfair competition, the rationale of the case seems irreconcilable
with the general principles of unfair competition. The court ig-
nored two underlying principles of unfair competition: likelihood
of consumer deception, and secondary meaning. The imitation of
Miss Booth's speaking voice, arguably not a creative work prod-
uct, acquired secondary meaning when heard in conjunction with
the cartoon character "Hazel." The ordinary viewer of the com-
mercial, with knowledge both of entertainer endorsements and
the fact that "Hazel's" voice was Booth's would presume Miss
Booth was, in fact, endorsing the product and receiving compen-
sation therefrom." Thus, the combination of voice and character
increased the likelihood of consumer deception.
A certain judicial obstructionism has been encountered when
bringing actions under unfair competition for imitation of per-
formers' styles. An example is to be found in the Sinatra court's
rejection of the unfair competition claim because
[t]here is no competition between Nancy Sinatra and Goodyear
Tire Company. Appellant is not in the tire business and Goodyear
is not selling phonograph records. There is no passing-off by the
defendant of the plaintiff's products as its own either by simulation
of name, slogan, device or other unfair trade practice. 8
The Lahr court quite properly saw through this bit of legal obfus-
cation:
7' Netterville, supra note 40, at 253.
7 The court stated: "Neither she nor the plaintiff were named or identified during
the commercials." 362 F. Supp. at 345 (emphasis added). The court also stated that
Goldstein reaffirmed the notion of Sears-Compco that preserves the right to copy or
imitate an idea. Id. at 346. This may well be, but voice as it relates to style is not an idea,
but rather the expression of an idea.
71 435 F.2d at 714.
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[P]laintiff here is not complaining of imitation in the sense of sim-
ply copying his material or his ideas, but of causing a mistake in
identity. Such passing off is the basic offense. True, it was not
defendant's product that was offered in competition, but that of
the anonymous imposter whom defendant, for its benefit, subsi-
dized. This is a distinction without a difference."'
2. Misappropriation
"The misappropriation doctrine is a common law, judge-
made offshoot of the general law of unfair competition . . .
usually invoked by a plaintiff who has what he considers a valua-
ble commercial 'thing' which he sees another has appropriated
... ,,s In those jurisdictions recognizing its existence" the mis-
appropriation doctrine circumvents the need for proof of fraud
upon the public. Relief is granted in cases where no fraud and
deception exits, but only a misappropriation for the commercial
advantage of one person of a benefit or of a property right of
another." Hence a performer's style should now be protectible in
those states accepting the misappropriation doctrine, dispensing
with the need for an allegation of palming-off or that the parties
are competitors.1
3
11 300 F.2d at 259 (emphasis added).
'0 1 McCATHY, § 10:23, at 318. Professor McCarthy provides a valuable and intrigu-
ing discussion of this doctrine, its origin, the dispute surrounding its acceptance, and
possible applications. See also Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder
Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dept. 1951) (per curiam); Pittsburg Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting
Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); Ahrens, The Misappropriation Doctrine After Sears-
Compco, 2 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 292 (1968); Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation in
Unfair Competition, 11 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1958); Note, Goldstein v. California: A New
Look for the Misappropriation Doctrine, 8 U. SAN FAN. L. Rav. 199 (1973).
11 (Alaska) Veatch v. Wagner, 116 F. Supp. 904 (D. Alaska 1953); (California) Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1969); (Delaware) Ettore
v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926
(1956); (Illinois) Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970);
(Massachusetts) Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934),
modified, 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936); (New York) Mutual
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1941); (Pennsyl-
vania) Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937); (Wisconsin)
Mercury Record Prod., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163, 218 N.W.2d
705 (1974).
82 p. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 63, at 92. One author has stated that a plaintiff seeking
protection under this doctrine must prove three elements:
(1) that time, effort and money has gone into the creation of the thing
misappropriated so that there is some "property right" in the thing taken;
(2) that there is appropriation by the defendant at little or no cost; and
(3) unless an injunction is granted there will be a diversion of the plaintiff's
profits to the defendant.
Ahrens, supra note 80, at 295.
13 P. GOtSTEIN, supra note 63, at 92.
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The foundations of the doctrine are credited to the Supreme
Court's holding in International News Service v. Associated
Press.4 The widespread acceptance of the doctrine was hindered
by the holdings in Sears and Compco,5 but Goldstein appears to
have removed any constitutional barriers previously blocking rec-
ognition of the misappropriation doctrine.8" Recently, the doc-
trine has been extended to protection from tape piracy of sound
recordings.8 7 The fact that style is an intangible property right
makes it no less a protectible property right as a product of a
performer's creative efforts. As the court noted in Mercury:
The essence of the cause of action in misappropriation is the defen-
dant's use of the plaintiff's product, into which the plaintiff has put
time, skill, and money; and the defendant's use of the plaintiff's
product or a copy of it in competition with the plaintiff. . . . The
wrong is not in the copying, but in the appropriation, of the plain-
tiff's time, effort and money.8
As the doctrine relates to style, no difficulties are encountered in
applying it to either a situation such as Chaplin, where the per-
former created the character as well as the expression of that
character, nor a situation such as Lahr, where the performer has
developed a distinctive vocal quality. In these situations style is
as much a product as is a record. In contrast, misappropriation
might be an inappropriate form of relief in a Booth-type fact
pattern, where the imitation is not of a voice creation but merely
the performer's own voice.
3. Defamation: A Rear-Guard Action
Closely related to the principles of unfair competition is defa-
mation. In fact, most cases alleging unfair competition have also
brought parallel actions for defamation. 9 The overlap between
unfair competition and defamation was noted by the court in
Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co."° The court held that if the
- 248 U.S. 215 (1918) wherein the plaintiff who gathered news for the purpose of
lucrative publication was held to have a "quasi-property" right in the product of his
efforts. The court afforded equitable relief against the appropriation of those efforts by
the defendant which constituted unfair competition. Id. at 236.
" See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text.
Note, supra note 80, at 212.
7 See Mercury Record Prod., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wisc. 2d 163,
218 N.W.2d 705 (1974).
88 Id. at 175, 218 N.W.2d at 710.
gg See Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); Gardella v. Log Cabin
Prod. Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
0 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937).
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imitation was of an inferior kind, an action for defamation might
arise." The court further recognized that the common element
existing between passing-off and defamation is confusion and
deception of the public." Thus, if a performer's style has been the
subject of an inferior imitation likely to cause damage to the
performer's reputation, the performer could successfully main-
tain an action in defamation.
There is, however, an essential weakness to a defamation
allegation based on inferior imitation. When rejecting this aspect
of Lahr's defamation claim, the court noted:
Even entertainers who make no claim to uniqueness have distinctive
vocal characteristics and may be thought to be recognized. If every
time one can allege, "Your [anonymous] commercial sounded like
me, but not so good," and contend the public believed, in spite of
the variance, that it was he, and at the same time believed, because
of the variance, that his abilities had declined, the consequences
would be too great to contemplate.3
Nevertheless, the court did argue that an action for inferior imita-
tion would exist if there were some element in addition to the
imitation per se which acted to identify plaintiff with the imita-
tion.
On the other hand, the Lahr court held that plaintiff's pro-
fessional reputation might be damaged through unauthorized
imitation in a commercial on the defamatory ground of having
"stooped to perform below his class." 4 But even this form of
defamation was rejected by the Booth court, which argued:
A star performer's endorsement of a commercial product is a com-
mon occurrence and does not indicate either a diminution of profes-
" The gravamen of the second phase of the cause of action . . . is that the
professional reputation of the appellee has been defamed. Eva Taylor's...
performance is alleged to have been of inferior quality thus causing deception
of the public and inducing the belief that appellee's abilities had deterio-
rated. If we assume these claims to be true, a cause of action for unfair
competition is stated which in turn consists of the tort of defamation.
Id. at 895.
92 Id. at 896.
" 300 F.2d at 259.
" The court stated:
A charge that an entertainer has stooped to perform below his class may be
found to damage his reputation. Plaintiffs allegations in this respect are not
insufficient. ...
[ult has never been held in defamation that a plaintiff must be identified
by name.
Id. at 258-59 (emphasis added).
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sional reputation nor a loss of professional talent, though plaintiff
herself might prefer to avoid such engagements."
In a sense, defamation requires a tortuous reasoning process,
which might successfully destroy any cause of action for the un-
authorized use. For example, the allegation of inferior quality
might weaken plaintiff's case such that the court will be unwilling
to find sufficient similarity to constitute passing-off or public
deception. If the imitation is so inferior, how could the public be
deceived? Although not impossible, it is improbable. Similarly
the theory of "stooping to perform below one's class" conflicts in
principle with the misappropriation doctrine, which presumes
that the performer's commercial base has been damaged by the
unauthorized use. Thus, a defamation action for imitation of a
performer's style should be used with circumspection, and plead-
ing in the alternative should be utilized.
4. Right of Publicity
A performer's style has potential protection under the newly
emerged doctrine termed the right of publicity. The right of pub-
licity has grown out of the interest and concern with the right to
privacy, which protects an individual's interest in being free from
unauthorized exploitation of his name or likeness." This protec-
tion begins with the tort of appropriation which was first recog-
nized in New York in the case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co. 7 When the court denied the existence of appropriation,
the New York legislature in reaction passed a statute making it
a misdemeanor and a tort to make use of the name, portrait, or
picture of any person for "advertising purposes" or for the pur-
pose of trade without written consent."
From the doctine of appropriation has arisen the right of
publicity. Mention of publicity as a protectible right was noted
by Warren and Brandeis:"
g5 362 F. Supp. at 349.
" The right of privacy was early recognized by Warren and Brandeis in their article
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). See also Green, The Right of Privacy,
27 ILL. L. REv. 237 (1932); Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and
Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REv. 637 (1973). See notes 104-07 infra and accompanying
text.
,7 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). Contra, Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.,
122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
,8 N.Y. CIV. IGHTS LAw §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1948) (originally enacted in 1903). See
also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1-.2 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-8 to -9
(1953).
" Warren & Brandeis, supra note 96.
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The common law secures to each individual the right of determin-
ing, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments and emo-
tions shall be communicated to others. . . . [E]ven if he has cho-
sen to give them expression, he generally retains the power to fix the
limits of the publicity which shall be given them. The existence of
this right does not depend upon the particular method of expression
adopted. It is immaterial whether it be by word or by signs, in
painting, by sculpture, or in music .... '0
The right of publicity has been called the antithesis of the
right of privacy. °0 The right of privacy protects one from injury
to self-esteem.0M One commentator has noted that in such cases
some sort of compensable injury occurs to the sensibilities as a
matter of law.' 3 The right of publicity protects not injury to self-
esteem, but rather recognizes the possibility of economic injury
to one's personality.'04 The case of Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co. ,05
illustrates that a celebrity has an economic interest in his person-
ality. Here the court said there was no invasion of privacy, but
there was an invasion of the antithesis, the right of publicity.'00
00 Id. at 198-99 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County 1957).
,o See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 172 U.S.P.Q. 541 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1972); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952); Kunz v. Allen,
102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918).
'1 Treece, supra note 96, at 641. Professor Treece in a discussion of Eick v. Perk Dog
Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952), reaches this conclusion after in essence
recognizing that the compensable injury must be based upon the offensiveness to one's
sense of justice as opposed to concrete facts. Id.
I", See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E.
55 (1938). For an excellent discussion of one author's view of the justification for protection
of public figures from unauthorized product endorsement see Treece, supra note 96, at
645-47. Professor Treece predicates his argument, with good cause, upon the effects of such
conduct upon the public.
114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County 1957).
oS Id. The court recognized that the right of publicity is, in effect, another form of
unfair competition.
On the other hand, where plaintiff is a person who may be termed a
"public figure", such as an actor or an athlete, the gist of this complaint is
entirely different. He does not complain that, by reason of the publication
of his picture in connection with the advertisement of a product, his name
and face have become a matter of public comment, but rather that the
commercial value which has attached to his name because of the fact that
he is a public figure has been exploited without his having shared in the
profits therefrom. ...
It is, therefore, our conclusion that the true theory upon which plaintiff
seeks to ground defendant's liability to him is the very antithesis of the right
of privacy. Plaintiff does not complain that his name should have been
withheld from public scrutiny: on the contrary, he asserts that his name has
1975
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When an advertiser appropriates that personality without his
consent, he injures that economic interest. °0
The right to privacy protects name and likeness as part of
personality. The right of publicity, if it is to protect a celebrity
from economic loss to his personality, cannot be so limited.' 8
Personality is defined as "the complex of characteristics that dis-
tinguishes a particular individual or individualizes or character-
izes him in his relationships with others . . . the total of distinc-
tive traits and characteristics . . . ."09
Those performers who create the expression of a character,
great commercial value in connection with the game of golf, and that defen-
dant's use of his name has resulted in damage to him. We therefore hold that
plaintiff's right of privacy has not been violated.
Therefore, in the instant case, if plaintiff is to recover damages from
defendant on the theory of unfair competition he must demonstrate: (1) That
he has an enforceable property right in the commercial value of his name and
photograph in connection with the game of golf; (2) that he did not author-
ized defendant to make any commercial use of his name and photograph,
and, (3) that the publication, sale and advertisement by defendant of the
book "Golf With the Masters" constituted unfair competition as to the plain-
tiff.
Id. at 314.
107 Treece, supra note 96, at 643. An interesting aspect of this, as well as any of the
tort theories discussed herein, would be the possibility of waiving one's cause of action in
tort and suing in assumpsit on a quasi-contractual theory. The authorities would indicate
that this possibility exists but that courts have been reluctant to allow this. Professor
Corbin defines quasi-contract as
a legal obligation, not based upon agreement, enforced either specifically or
by compelling the obligor to restore the value of that by which he was un-
justly enriched.
Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations, 21 YALE L.J. 533, 550 (1912) (emphasis omitted).
Professor Gordon provides an excellent discussion as to why courts have denied quasi-
contract as an alternative in right of privacy situations. He does note, however:
Since the basis of recovery in quasi-contract is the defendant's enrichment,
it is clear that only those tortious acts which produce enrichment can provide
the grounds for an action in assumpsit ...
There is no reason why a tortious invasion of privacy may not produce
enrichment for the wrongdoer. Thus, in cases where it does one might reason-
ably expect that quasi-contractual relief will be granted.
Gordon, Recoveries for Violation of the Right of Privacy in Quasi-Contract and the Federal
Income Tax: An Illustration of Law's Response to Changes in Attitudes About the
Personality, 7 WAYNE L. REv. 368, 370-71 (1964), 7 PEAL 357, 360-61 & n. 17 (1967).
0I The recent commentators would indicate that privacy itself should be more liber-
ally defined. See, e.g., Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RurrGERs L. REv. 275 (1974).
This author defines privacy as "control over when and by whom the various parts of us
can be sensed by others." Id. at 281.
" WEBsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1687 (fifth definition listed) (P.
Gove ed. 1961).
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or a unique style of their own, have created a reflection of person-
ality and a form of expressing that personality. Performers such
as Miss Booth whose own voice or personal traits are appropriated
should be even better protected under this doctrine. Within the
framework of the definition of personality, the use of one's own
voice in performing comprises an aspect of personality. As War-
ren and Brandeis noted, the existence of the right to limit public-
ity is not affected by the "method of expression." Hence, style
and personal traits used in performing should be given protection
under the right of publicity when an advertiser appropriates that
aspect of personality, and deceives the public into believing that
the celebrity has endorsed his product.
The celebrity who depends upon an aspect of his personality
as his source of income and notoriety has a vested economic inter-
est in that personality as a means of livelihood. The practice of
celebrity endorsement of a product has become a common one
and is a lucrative source of income for the performer. If a per-
former's style or voice is appropriated without permission or com-
pensation, future attempts to secure an engagement for product
endorsement might be thwarted, since the primary value of celeb-
rity endorsement to the sponsor is the fact that the public is given
a feeling of the product's approval by the performer who is asso-
ciated only with the sponsor's product.
An additional consideration apart from the financial depri-
vation resulting from unauthorized use is the inability of the
performer to control whether or not he wants to be associated with
product endorsement in any form. In other words, he is unable
to "fix the limits of publicity" given his style. This was exempli-
fied in Booth wherein Miss Booth's voice would not in and of itself
invoke "Hazel," yet the imitation of Miss Booth's voice coupled
with the cartoon character "Hazel" would invoke Miss Booth as
the endorser. Miss Booth alone should have the right to deter-
mine if and when her voice, in fact or by imitation, is to be used
in conjunction with the portrayal of the cartoon character.
CONCLUSION
A performer's style may be the expression of a character or
may exist independent of any character expression. A performer
begins an unconscious search for style through trial and error,
rejecting those techniques which do not meet his attempts at
expression. Two things tend to gradually narrow or define the
limits of his expression: 1) what a performer wants to do, and 2)
1975
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what he is capable of doing best. Inherent in the first is the
attempt to meet his own needs of fulfillment. The latter is often
determined by audience reaction, i.e., how the performer best
conveys meaning to his audience. By trying certain acting tech-
niques, for example, a performer may find that some are not the
way in which he best expresses himself or that he does not enjoy
that means of expression. At the same time, he may also develop
the ability to express to his audience different ideas in different
ways by use of a unique combination of technique in a given
situation.
Thus, these two factors work together to help the performer
realize his limitations, both in capabilities and desires. The word
"limitations" is used only in the positive sense of helping narrow
the scope of those physical manifestations which are to be solidi-
fied into an identifiable style, uniquely personal to that per-
former. At some point, the performer becomes conscious of the
process and is capable of directing and governing the elements
which will become his "style." The culmination of this process
may take years for some, a relatively short time for others, or may
never occur at all. Those performers who successfully create a
unique style have used those techniques in a given situation and
have continued their expansion and development to meet their
needs for creative expression. This style manifests itself in tim-
ing, voice, gestures, mannerisms, and dress. What has evolved is
personal to the individual. In other words, he has ascertained his
limitations and turned to the perfection of the realm within those
limitations. This is a creation of that individual's mind and is his
representation of the ideas he chooses to express.
"Style" heretofore has been afforded virtually no protection
from unauthorized appropriation. As noted above, those perform-
ers who have created a unique identifiable style may be one of two
types. First, those who create the character and the expression of
that character, such as Chaplin, are probably the most unusual.
From this uniqueness, however, arises the misconception that
style must be equated with an idea. But there are the performers
such as Falk who create only the expression of the character, and
the performers who create a unique style which exists indepen-
dently of any character portrayed, such as Bert Lahr and "The
Fifth Dimension." One point emerges from a comparison of these,
i.e., style can and does exist independent of any character-idea.
"Style" consists of a unique combination of posture, dress,
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mannerisms, gestures, and/or vocal delivery, that individual
combination being sufficiently developed to distinguish that per-
former from all others. As such, style must be recognized as and
afforded its place among those protectible, intangible intellectual
property rights. Style is capable of being delineated a "writing"
within the constitutional framework and is therefore eligible for
copyright protection.
The traditionally liberal defense of fair use would still protect
those imitators who act in good faith. The irony of this defense is
that for many years, it has protected the imitator because of his
own unique "style," yet no protection has been available for the
style of the performer imitated. Statutory requirements of tangi-
bility can be met by the filing of pictorial narratives and video-
tapes as well as tapes of unique vocal style. However, because the
statutory "writings" have been more strictly interpreted than
constitutionally protectible "writings," Congress will remain re-
luctant to grant such protection for style. As a result, style must
be protected by state and common law theories.
The imitation of style, when done in good faith, is not only
permissible but desirable. It is when this style is appropriated for
commercial exploitation, either by another performer or an ad-
vertiser, that the wrong occurs. The latter is of special importance
because of two resulting consequences. The public is deceived
into believing that a performer has endorsed a product and has
received compensation therefor. But, the performer has not re-
ceived compensation and in fact is deprived of something greater.
He is denied the right to choose when, how, and under what
circumstances his creative expression, style, is used. His oppor-
tunities for future product endorsement are narrowed, and the
advertiser is allowed to profit with no need to reveal the source
of the imitation. As the law currently stands, such an advertiser
would be foolish to offer a performer a chance for product en-
dorsement and to compensate him therefor when he is free to copy
that style and pass it off to the public as originating from the
original creator with little or no fear of judicial sanction. The
problem exists, and will remain as long as courts and legislatures
fail to take cognizance and afford protection.
Those performers who have not created an identifiable style
and/or have merely developed their own personal traits which
have become readily identifiable by the public have not produced
a unique expression worthy of copyright protection. However,
1975
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they too deserve protection from commercial exploitation in prod-
uct advertising under the right of publicity, defamation, and un-
fair competition. For those performers, as well as those who have
created a style, secondary meaning may attach under given cir-
cumstances such that the voice or style becomes an identifying
"mark" and possibly protectible under Lanham Act section 43(a)
which is designed to protect the public from such false advertising
practices.
The challenge is presented-the answers will emerge only if
that challenge is met. Since Congress has failed to act, states are
now free to do so and should provide protection for those who
have become the "authors" of "style" in order that they may be
free from unfair use and "outright poaching" of their creative
efforts.
Cheryl L. Hodgson
